Imperial Trends in Global International Society by Horga, Ioan
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Imperial Trends in Global International
Society
Ioan Horga
University of Oradea, Institute of Euroregional Studies
Oradea-Debrecen
2010
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44851/
MPRA Paper No. 44851, posted 8. March 2013 14:09 UTC
Imperial Trends in Global International Society 
                                                       
Ioan HORGA 
 
Abstract. Although multipolar, Global International Society has unipolar 
(imperial) trends too. Even if it is dominated by several stakeholders, current 
international system is a strong “state system”. Yet only a small number of states have 
structural power being able to influence the nature of international system. 
Multidimensional system of power determines hierarchy and balance of power in 
Global International Society. International agendas are interdependent – military, 
economic and environmental agendas provide the premises to promote unipolar trends. 
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After the fall of the Berlin Wall that put an end to bipolarism in international 
relations, current international society has been characterised by a turmoil that James 
Rosenau called an “uncertain and tense situation”1. As compared to the New European 
Renaissance, specialists in international relations have noticed a change of 
configuration on both reality and perception levels, as well as in magnitude and depth. 
Dynamics characterising international society of the century has shown anarchy and 
order, globalisation and fragmentation, globalisation and heterogeneity, complexity 
and interdependence. 
Even specialists in international relations have been surprised by the evolution 
of international reality particularly since our mentality has remained to the perceptions 
resulting from the fractures in international society during the Cold War (fracture East 
– West, centre – periphery, North – South). As Susane Strange2, one of the most 
reputed specialists in contemporary international relations, noticed human mentality 
still has imprints of the idea that the analysis of international relations is achieved from 
the perspective of transnational empire. Yet, there is no apparent change or 
multiplication of international stakeholders. Transnational societies and financial flows 
are not yet prevented by either territory or border. They have been perceived as 
superpowers being able to stabilise or destabilise great regions worldwide. In 
conclusion, we can notice that the typology of relations – whether cooperation or 
conflict – are ceaselessly changing. Consequently, cascade changes are no longer 
perceived as fragmentations of international relations, but as continuity data
3
. For 
instance, the enlargement of the EU to Central and Eastern Europe has been based on 
the logic of continuity thus representing the disappearance of the fracture between East 
and West
4
. 
Hence the natural question if in the Global International Society there might 
still be unipolar (imperial) trends. In this paper, we aim at showing that it is possible 
and even necessary. We have two categories of arguments. On the one hand, we will 
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attempt at seizing the possibility of a unipolar logic through the features of 
contemporary international system. On the other hand, we will seek to see this element 
through the specific agendas that global international society supports. 
Before getting to the core of the topic, it is important to make a brief 
introduction of the features of unipolar (imperial) international system. In this case, 
only one power settles the agenda, dictates the norms and controls all resources of the 
power. Hegemonic power brings together its power of coercion – much superior to 
other units of the system – by imposing their own system of values5. Here, one can 
speak of a hegemonic system considering that domination relationships are built 
vertically. 
The stability of the system enters a crisis at a time when clerk logic is altered; 
horizontal relationships between the units of the system are degraded, as their own 
power is eroded from within (internal fights, destruction of resources) and because 
there is a change of system due to the penetration of external elements  All these 
elements lead to the changing nature of  power
6
. 
As a consequence of the USA ascendance, several authors consider that we are 
facing a new unipolar logic. Robert Gilpin considers that after 1945, the United States 
of America have acquired the status of “hegemonic power7”. Raymond Aron calls the 
USA an “imperial republic” with reference from representatives of the left American 
school of international relations, that is, George Liska and Hary Magdoff
8
, as well as 
the analysis of the American diplomacy in 1945-1972
9
.  
 
1. Global International System has unipolar (imperial) features 
A. Although dominated by several stakeholders, the current international 
system is a strong “state system”. The decreasing number of stakeholders making up 
the structure of the system and the hierarchy issues resulting from it is highly important 
as they own the structural force to settle the rules of the game on a global level in 
international system
10
. The use of the notion of international system instead of state 
system can be explained by the fact that the definition of structure considers the logic 
of powers without neglecting transnational aspects involved in the control of force 
derived from the great powers
11
. 
A complex analysis of unipolar trend in international society after 1991 is 
carried out by Strobe Talbot in the chapter suggestively entitled The Unipolar Decades 
in the book on The Great Experiment. The Story of Ancient Empires, Modern States, 
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and the Quest for a Global Nation
12
. At the beginning of 1991, from the conclusion of 
one of the most influent intellectuals focused on American Foreign Policy, Charles 
Krauthammer, when speaking in an article entitled The Unipolar Moment of the United 
States as “the unchallenged superpower would be the centre of world power, the 
principal maker and enforcer of rules for everyone else, and the metropole of a modern 
(or perheps postmodern) global empire”13, presents the dynamics of unipolar trends14 
towards a New world order.  Strob Talbot considers that although George Bush did not 
conclude a Pax Americana in 1991 after the war in Kuwait, the Pax Universalis that 
put an end to the event built responsibilities and aspirations for the United States
15
 to 
be validated by the wars in Yugoslavia
16
. The position of the United States at the Rio 
de Janeiro conference in June 1992 and the refusal to sign the treaty to preserve forest 
biodiversity is a sign of unipolar position. The change in NATO’s strategy after 1994, 
the ever more active involvement of the United States in actions meant to solve certain 
interethnic conflicts (Rwanda, Haiti, former Yugoslavia) are considered unipolar trends 
as well
17
. The good American offices to solve decades old conflicts (Northern Ireland, 
Near East) bring to the foreground the responsibility of unipolar power for the security 
of certain regions in the world. War against terrorism triggered after 9/11 is an 
expression of ambivalence – aspiration/responsibility – characterising the unipolar 
trend of the United States
18
. The more and more responsible involvement of the United 
States in the measures for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, in limiting climate 
changes, in limiting the effects of pandemics striking wide areas
19
 shows not only the 
diversification of unipolar responsibilities, but also the aspiration to build a world order 
centred on the American model. 
 B. Only great powers have structural power. According to Susan Strange, 
structural power involves control on security, manufacturing, finances and knowledge 
– science, technology, and culture20. Historical analyses carried out on growing and 
fading powers show that the most important is the hard side of power, that is, control 
on security and manufacturing
21
. John Ikenberry considers that imperial order putting 
an end to the “balance of power” stands for a “post realist order of liberal 
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hegemony”22. Current global analyses show that the soft aspect of power, that is, 
communication and finances, is highly important for the time being
23
. At the end of the 
Cold War, there is a return to historical pessimism laying stress on security control as a 
central analysis factor
24
. This has been even more obvious after 9/11. 
C. Multidimensional character of force. Considering that in the past decades 
there have been many stakeholders in international system with attributes of a 
structural power, we may say that currently the force of international system has a 
multidimensional character. This idea has been shown by several authors. Susan 
Strange points out that not only states can fulfil the role of a structural power, as even 
criminal associations such as mafia can do it
25
. Robert Gilpin considers that there is a 
convergence between state power and its transnational enterprises
26
.  
D. Hierarchy and balance between great powers are two fundamental 
structural elements ordering international anarchy (Anarchic Orders and Balances of 
Power – Kenneth N. Wlatz)27 and turning it from mere chaotic plurality into a state 
system
28
. The two elements provide a relative order leading to a better understanding 
and a predictability of international system processes
29
.  
 
2. Current international agendas favour unipolar (imperial) trends 
The concept of agenda designates a group of issues at the basis of organising 
political activity. This concept is extremely useful as it orders explanations and 
connects them with events that occur. For instance, armed conflicts – one of the classic 
topics of the military agenda – are nowadays inseparable from the phenomenon of 
economic globalisation – criminal economy developed as mining exploitation, 
weapons or narcotics trafficking – to individual action characterising global agenda – 
humanitarian assistance or mercenary groups. 
Most specialists in international relations consider that the world is highly 
complex now. This change has been more explicit in 1990-1991 after the 
dismembering of the USSR and the Gulf war (1991)
30
. Yet the complexity of current 
international society has found its origins in changes taking place in the world in the 
1970s (economic revival of Europe and Japan, as well as transnational actors coming to 
the foreground) and the 1980s (alteration of economic processes derived after 
globalization and the appearance of the environmental issue). These changes have 
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become variables influencing the bipolar relations between the USA and the USSR
31
. 
The disappearance of this bipolarity has led to important changes on the international 
agenda, particularly in the military field and then in other fields, such as the economic, 
global and environmental fields. 
Inevitably, such evolution has risen several questions. The most important is 
the one on who owns structural power in the world or, in other words, who settles 
international agenda and who designates working norms of international society. After 
the end of the Cold War, military agenda does not seem to be the only one undergoing 
radical changes. In order to analyse other changes, it is important to achieve a complex 
analysis of the military agenda. 
 
 
 
2.1. Military agenda 
A. The central issue of military agenda is security. The end of the Cold War 
has tried to achieve a substitution of the concept on national security lying at the basis 
of defence of own national territory with military tools with the concept of global 
security. The new conception on security shows that military dimension is devoid of 
value. What has been predicted during the 1987 United Nations Conference for 
disarmament and development has happened. Security does not only derive from 
military aspects, but also from economic, social, humanitarian and ecological aspects. 
Increasing security can set the stage for increasing disarmament. At the same time, it 
may set the stage for sustainable development
32
. 
Multidimensional and global character of security is the product of a thinking 
that has to be understood as it did not appear at the end of the Cold War. The end of the 
Cold War would reconfigure the terms of security. 
First of all, theoreticians and politicians will try to revalue new dimensions of 
security focusing their studies on adjacent phenomena
33
, such as migration, integrism 
or natural catastrophes; these last features are the core of another agenda, the global 
agenda. Consequently, topics such as peace, democracy, environment and 
development have begun to be considered core topics on the military agenda. 
Secondly, as periphery security can no longer be explained through notions 
such as decolonisation or bipolarity, it becomes incomplete and is associated with 
topics apparently parallel with it. 
Beginning with observations referring to the new vision on security, we can 
establish a first direct correlation between the end of the Cold War (decreasing 
militarism and responses of the defence) and the new dimensions of security 
(sustainable development). Under the circumstances, the discourse on defence of peace 
has appeared. The end of the Cold War has not put an end to hegemonic wars or 
conflicts at the periphery of international system. On the contrary, the Gulf war 
triggered in 1991 developed within the concept of geostrategic security and the cult of 
limiting weapons worldwide. Ten years later, after 9/11 and the beginning of the war 
against terrorism, there is a revival of national security to preserve hegemonic power in 
the military field. 
                                            
31 Martin Wight, Politica de putere, Bucureşti, Ed. Arc, 1998, pp. 62-68 
32 E. Barbe, op. cit, p. 280. 
33 R. Cooper, Destrămarea naţiunilor…, pp. 92-108 
The world is divided into two fields when considering violence. Considering 
Mary Kaldor’s work on New Wars. Organised Violence in a Global Era, we may see 
that when passing from bipolar international society to global international society, 
actions involving violence are getting stronger. 
First of all, the end of bipolarity at the end of the Cold War has been a 
framework favouring the appearance of an area dominated by chaos, by unsafe or grey 
zones. These spaces have resulted from the evolution of modern state towards 
decentralisation, the disappearance of violence monopole and the disintegration of 
states by settling structures on ethnic criteria. For example, the erosion of the state in 
Africa has made many authors speak of failed states
34
. These failed states are not only 
on the African continent. There are some in Europe, where the EU Member States have 
given away some of their sovereignty to Brussels. There are two types of state failure: 
the African one overwhelmed with violence (Sub-Saharan Africa) and the European 
one in the context of integration as states are involved in a process of conscientious and 
peaceful dissolution. The disappearance of the USSR and Yugoslavia, both federal 
states, has left room to a great conflict space at the end of the war. 
Secondly, globalisation has influenced new wars. The impact of globalisation 
has been obvious in the case of war actors – foreign soldiers, voluntary expatriates, 
United Nations officers, peacekeeping troops – and economic factors – illegal weapon, 
drugs, valuables or human trade. The impact of globalisation has led to changing 
previously settled international regulations; they no longer protect civilians and involve 
them in conflicts – paramilitary or mafia groups. 
Thirdly, globalisation has led to the establishment of “grey zones” that have 
become very important in the evolution of international relations. These grey zones 
have preserved violence in the conflict area and are based on illegal trafficking and 
terrorist movements. Areas neighbouring potential conflicting areas, such as former 
Yugoslavia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Andin America and Africa
35
, are strictly 
supervised through preventive diplomacy, peace keeping and stabilising peace. 
B. The phenomenon of military agenda buy-out. Changing the features of 
wars, the appearance of parallel systems of protection and defence of multinational 
societies or mafia groups belong to personal security in the 21
st
 century. It will no 
longer have a public dimension acquiring a private dimension too. Globalisation has 
led to a phenomenon of “war buy-out” through connections between complex global 
financial flows and strategy concerning actions of terrorist organisations. According to 
Thierry de Montbrial, “Bin Laden is not a reaction of the traditional Islam, but an 
aberrant avatar of globalisation through both tools of its efficiency (technique, 
competence, organisation) and disconnection of action by genuine societies”36.  
 
2.2. Economic agenda compels us to remember that the end of the Cold War 
is identified with the victory of the capitalist system. Fukuyama explained it through 
the so-called “end of history”37. The planetary existence of the capitalist system, or the 
so-called process of globalisation, has not been achieved due to the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, which was a physical impediment, or the psychological barrier imposed by the 
existence of alternatives or other possible worlds. 
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A. The economic agenda defines the fundamental reason of our era: 
globalisation. The phenomenon of globalisation has been explained through several 
features: the increasing number of interactions and interdependences, the appearance of 
a feeling of globalising perception, the adoption of liberalising policies breaking down 
all barriers, etc. From the point of view of current international society – a society 
based on interstate logic – it has been noticed that globalisation suppresses the notions 
of action marks of international stakeholders, that is, territory and time. Naturally, 
globalisation has influenced states as they become structures anchored in the 
philosophy of territorial sovereignty. The suppression of sovereignty has also caused 
the phenomenon of time compression. An example in point is the suppression of EU 
internal borders control followed by the compression of time for circulation of goods, 
persons, capitals and services. 
At the same time, technological revolution in the field of informatics leading to 
an unprecedented compression of time has deep consequences on economic life. 
Through electronic operations in the financial field, electronic trade on the internet, 
videoconferences in enterprise management, a new economic reality is being built – 
virtual economy. 
B. Globalisation and fragmentation of the world live together in current 
international society
38
. In the context of tensions between democracy and 
totalitarianism, most authors consider that globalisation and fragmentation have been 
more obvious after the end of the Cold War
39
. Actually, these 
globalisation/fragmentation tensions appeared long before 1989. A first aspect of the 
phenomenon is worldwide expansion of values and technology providing incentives 
for the will for individualisation translated into the defence of own identity. In certain 
cases, there have been bursts of self-determinism, such as the cases of the USSR and 
Yugoslavia. These globalisation/fragmentation tensions have also occurred in the 
context of regional economic integration processes. It has been shown by the 
multiplied regional commercial agreements. For instance, in 1948-1949, seven regional 
commercial agreements were signed, while 38 agreements were signed in 1990-1994
40
. 
All over the planet, regionalism has been present from the European economic 
and monetary integration to the North American free trade area and similar processes 
in South America and Africa. However, there is another reality, too – regionalisation of 
world trade is focused in the triangle represented by Western Europe, North America 
and Eastern Asia, which excludes most of the planet. In other words, trade between 
these regional blocks and within them is over ¾ of world trade. 
This world unbalance makes that most of the population throughout the world 
is excluded from benefits of globalisation, which causes a deep division and 
consequently a fervent dispute. Thus, we can say that globalisation is a universal 
process expressed in an irregular manner. 
C. The issue of power in a globalised economy world. The international 
economic system resulting particularly after 1990 has supported the hegemonic role of 
the United States. Hegemonic stability provided by this superpower involves a certain 
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organisation of market and certain strategic-diplomatic conditions needed for the 
survival of other states. Nowadays, there are voices considering that irrespective of the 
power currently dominating the world, the economic field cancels political power
41
. 
The articulation of political power and economic globalisation raises less the 
topic of world economic powers’ responsibility. Curiously, the responsibility of some 
global governing bodies, such as the IMF, OECD, G8 and OMC, is contested by broad 
social movements. They are blamed for worldwide economic unbalances
42
. 
D. The process of globalisation coincides with identity resurrection. The 
topic of identities is a central phenomenon of global international society. Thus, we 
witness a paradox: globalisation assumes the disappearance of two fundamental 
references – time and space, while identity is superposed on a territory with all its 
symbols and claims the defence of its cultural values originating in its own history. In 
simple terms, the global character of technology is opposed to the particular character 
of culture. Although English is the internet language of communication, it will have to 
coexist with other 3000 languages. 
We can say that the era of globalisation is converted into the era of identities. 
The management of globalisation-fragmentation/identity is one of the greatest 
challenges of the future international society. 
Trying to draw a conclusion on the main aspects of global agenda, we can 
mention the following ideas: there still is a classic polarisation of state system; 
multilateralism proves to be necessary as a governing solution of global agenda; 
regionalism has led to structuring the triade international economic system. The 
existence of two worlds – a world of peace and a world of chaos – responds to a 
different economic and political reality. 
2.3. Environmental agenda 
As of the 1970s, there has arisen the idea that different spaces making up the 
natural environment of human species are threatened by pollution ignoring borders that 
is susceptible to be preserved without international cooperation. Some of them (extra-
atmospheric space, bottoms of the sea) are proclaimed “common patrimony of 
humanity”. On the level of civic awareness, there is a perception of the need for 
defending environment. 
The situation of environment is alarming at least from four points of view: 
climate changes, limitation of biodiversity, land clearings, degrading soil. 
A. Climate changes are developing at an alarming pace. Global temperature 
has risen by almost a degree in the past century. Satellites show that ozone in 
Antarctica atmosphere has diminished by 10%. Because of industrial activity, CO2 
accumulations in the atmosphere have reached in the latter half of the 20
th
 century 
levels equivalent to accumulations over almost half a million years. According to the 
resolution of the Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere: Implications for 
Global Security (1988), humankind is making an involuntary, uncontrolled and 
generalised global experiment with consequences resembling a nuclear war
43
. 
B. Dangers on biodiversity can be found in genes, individuals, species and 
ecosystems. The pace of species emergence reached an alarming rate in the 20
th
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century: three species a year. First it is the result of overexploitation of those species 
with commercial value, then the result of destroying their habitat. 
C. Land clearing process is alarming and turns soil into desert. Yet the 
most alarming aspect is woods quality diminishing at a galloping pace in the latter half 
of the century.  
D. Degrading soil is strictly connected to the land clearing process 
rendering it difficult for agriculture and supporting certain ecosystems. Soil 
degrading is caused by developing urbanisation and commercial exploitation of soil, 
particularly by irrigations thus leading to salinity of soil. 
Africa and Asia are the most affected continents by soil degrading with 
consequences on food crisis in the area. As well, climate changes contribute to a 
genuine regional ecological disaster. 
Besides these short-term issues, we have to remind ocean pollution, 
diminishing fishing stock, sweet water management, toxic chemicals and waste 
storage, including the radioactive ones. 
Thus, cooperation in the environmental field develops on bilateral, regional 
and universal levels. There is no autonomous international organisation specifically in 
charge with environmental protection. Within their competence, each specialised 
institution can have concerns in the field or adopt regulating measures. 
Environmental agenda in the past decade as seen through the Kyoto Protocol to 
limit CO2 emissions and particularly the failure of the Copenhagen Conference (2009) 
on climate change has certain unipolar trends. CO2 pollution is a topic defining 
imperial policies as well as their consequences – climate changes. There are premises 
to witness a change of paradigm in Global International Society after the current 
economic crisis by passing from defining imperial power depending on the criterion of 
military and economic agenda to defining it according to environmental agenda. 
In conclusion, the Global International Society has several unipolar trends 
although with a multipolar aspect. Even if it is dominated by several stakeholders, the 
current international system is still a strong “state system” 44where only a small number 
of states have structural power and are able to influence the nature of international 
system. Multidimensional system of force determines hierarchy and balance of power 
in Global International Society. International agendas in tight interdependence – 
military, economic and environmental agendas – settle sufficient premises to promote 
unipolar trends.
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